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ABSTRACT
Studies of the consumption-smoothing benefits of unemployment insurance (UI) have found that
the optimal benefit level is very small, perhaps even 0, for conventional levels of risk aversion. In
this paper, I derive a formula for the optimal benefit rate in terms of income and price elasticities
of unemployment durations, directly inferring risk aversion for the unemployed from their
behavioral responses to UI benefits. The optimal rate of social insurance is shown to depend
positively on the size of the income elasticity and negatively on the size of the substitution elasticity.
I estimate these elasticities using semi-parametric hazard models and variation in UI laws across
states and over time. The estimates indicate that income effects account for 70% of the effect of UI
on unemployment durations, and yield an optimal replacement rate around 50% of pre-
unemployment wages. These results challenge the prevailing view that social safety nets provide








The United States spent approximately $200 billion on income security programs in 2000.1
The large size and continued growth of social safety nets in the US and other countries raise
an important question in public ﬁnance.2 Estimates of the consumption smoothing beneﬁts
of UI by Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001), and others imply that the optimal
beneﬁt level is lower than 10% of an individual’s pre-unemployment wage, and perhaps
even 0, for “reasonable” levels of risk aversion.3 The reason is that empirical estimates of
the distortionary costs of UI appear to outweigh its consumption-smoothing beneﬁts, which
appear to be signiﬁcantly mitigated by other mechanisms of smoothing income shocks such
as spousal labor supply, savings, and borrowing.4 The diﬀerence between predictions of the
optimal beneﬁt level and actual beneﬁt levels, which are on average 50% of pre-unemployment
wages in the US and even higher in European countries, is striking. Do existing studies
underestimate the beneﬁts of UI and other large income security programs, or are these
programs indeed unjustiﬁed on economic grounds?
In this paper, I show that studies which conclude that the optimal UI beneﬁtr a t ei s
low implicitly assume that the income eﬀects from UI are small relative to substitution
(price) eﬀects, and ﬁnd that this assumption is rejected by the data. To see the how this
assumption is made, consider the standard Baily (1978) model of optimal UI, which is what
Gruber uses to calculate the optimal beneﬁt rate. In this model, the optimal beneﬁt level
1This ﬁgure includes the three largest income security programs: In 2000, Unemployment Insurance
costs amounted to $25 billion (Ways and Means Green Book 2000); Workers Compensation, $56 billion
(National Academy of Social Insurance); and Survivors Beneﬁts and Disability Insurance, $113 billion (Oﬃce
of Management and Budget).
2Krueger and Meyer (2002) document the growth in social insurance around the world.
3These results assume a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion less than 2. Higher levels of risk aversion
sharply increase the optimal replacement rate, as shown below.
4These ﬁndings may seem to be at odds with some recent papers on the optimal path of UI beneﬁts
that give high optimal replacement rates (e.g. Davidson and Woodbury (1997), Hopenhayn and Niccolini
(1998)). However, these papers consider models where consumption equals income from UI while unem-
ployed, eﬀectively assuming a very large consumption-smoothing role for UI. If this assumption is relaxed,
as in Werning (2002), the optimal level of beneﬁts remains very low unless risk aversion is high.
1depends on three parameters: (1) the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to
beneﬁts, which quantiﬁes the size of the moral hazard problem; (2) the drop in consumption
as a function of UI beneﬁts, which quantiﬁes the consumption-smoothing beneﬁts; and (3)
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (γ), which reﬂects the value of having a smoother
consumption path. The ﬁrst two parameters have been estimated using data on the behavior
of unemployed individuals (see e.g. Meyer (1990), Gruber (1997)). However, the curvature
of the utility function has not been estimated for the population of unemployed individuals.
Many economists contend that γ < 2 based on introspection about preferences over gambles,
in which case the optimal beneﬁt rate is indeed quite low. But the optimal beneﬁtr a t ei s
highly sensitive to the value of γ, and estimates of risk aversion vary signiﬁcantly depending
on the nature of the risk.5 Hence, estimating γ for the unemployed is of interest in evaluating
the optimal level of UI.
I address this issue by developing a method of estimating γ for the unemployed directly
from data on their search behavior. I show that in Baily’s model of unemployment, there is
a connection between the coeﬃc i e n to fr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o na n dt h er a t i oo ft h ei n c o m ea n d
price elasticities of unemployment durations.6 That is, large income eﬀects are evidence of
a highly curved underlying utility over consumption. Intuitively, if an individual increases
eﬀort signiﬁcantly to recoup lost income when unemployed, that lost income must have raised
the marginal utility of consumption signiﬁcantly, implying that γ is large. Since the lost
income is so highly valued, it follows that the welfare gain from UI is large and the optimal
beneﬁt rate should be relatively high. Hence, the optimal rate of social insurance depends
positively on the size of the income elasticity and negatively on the size of the substitution
5For example, Gertner (1993) and Metrick (1995) overcome this limitation by using actual behavior on
game shows and ﬁnd γ =4and γ =0 , respectively. Szpiro (1986) ﬁnds γ =2using aggregate time series
on insured property and insurance premiums. Barsky et. al. (1997) use responses to hypothetical gambles
over lifetime income on the Health and Retirment Survey to estimate γ =1 2 .
6This result is an application of the method developed in Chetty (2003), who shows that data on labor
supply choices can be used to make inferences about risk aversion without any assumptions beyond those of
expected utility theory.
2elasticity.
The empirical portion of this paper implements this method by estimating income and
price eﬀects for job searchers using variation in UI laws. While there is no formal evidence
on the relative importance of income and substitution eﬀects in UI, the conventional view
is that substitution eﬀects must dominate income eﬀects because UI beneﬁts are a trivial
fraction of lifetime income. In their recent review of the literature on social insurance,
Krueger and Meyer (2002) conclude that behavioral responses to beneﬁts are probably large
because “UI and WC [workers compensation] lead to short-run variation in wages with mostly
a substitution eﬀect.” However, this intuition does not account for the fact that most
agents enter unemployment with very low assets and are highly credit constrained: Gruber’s
ﬁnding that small variations in UI beneﬁts induce changes in average food consumption
directly implies that the representative UI recipient is unable to smooth consumption using
permanent income. Such credit constraints make it plausible that income eﬀects play a
large role in determining unemployment durations.
Id e c o m p o s et h eU Ib e n e ﬁt elasticity into an income and price eﬀect using variation in the
path of beneﬁts across states in the US and by exploiting the ﬁnite duration of UI beneﬁts.
For instance, variations in the waiting period for UI beneﬁts permits identiﬁcation of an
income eﬀect. After the ﬁrst week of unemployment has passed, claimants in states without
waiting weeks have eﬀectively received a temporary lump-sum grant relative to claimants
in states with waiting weeks. By comparing unemployment exit rates in the two groups of
states, we can identify the eﬀect of unearned income on search behavior. Another method
of estimating an income elasticity is by examining the eﬀect of UI on unemployment exit
hazards after beneﬁts have been exhausted, since beneﬁt levels can only aﬀect unemployment
exit rates through an income eﬀect after this point. More generally, it is shown that the
time-varying relationship between UI beneﬁt rates and unemployment exit hazards permits
inferences about the size of income eﬀects.
Estimates of semi-parametric hazard models for unemployment exit reveal that UI ben-
3eﬁts aﬀect search behavior primarily through income eﬀects. For instance, small lump-sum
grants at the beginning of a spell have signiﬁcant eﬀects on unemployment exit rates in early
weeks. In addition, the provision of generous UI beneﬁts continues to lower unemploy-
ment exit hazards well past the beneﬁt exhaustion date. Under conservative assumptions
on exogenously speciﬁed parameters, the results imply that more than 70% of the eﬀect
of UI on unemployment durations comes through an income eﬀect. The large income ef-
fect implies that γ ≈ 4.75 for the unemployed and results in an optimal UI replacement
rate of approximately 50%. The estimates suggest that the UI system in the US provides
consumption-smoothing beneﬁts that are worth about 1% of wages, an order of magnitude
larger than the welfare gain implied by prior studies. These results challenge the prevailing
view that social safety nets provide minimal gains in welfare at a large eﬃciency cost.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a Baily-
type model of unemployment and derives a formula for risk aversion and the optimal UI
beneﬁt level in terms of income and price elasticities for unemployment durations. Section
3 describes the UI law variation used to estimate these elasticities, summarizes the data, and
reports estimates of hazard models. Section 4 translates the hazard estimates into values
for risk aversion of the unemployed and computes the optimal UI beneﬁt level. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the reason that income eﬀects may be so large for the short-
term unemployed, in contrast with long-term labor supply behavior, where a large literature
has found small income eﬀects.
7Of course, it does not follow that direct government provision of these safety nets is optimal; other
methods of insurance provision may improve welfare further.
42I n c o m e E ﬀects and Unemployment Insurance
2.1 Model
This section derives a formula for the optimal UI beneﬁt rate using a representative-agent
two-period model of unemployment.8 The two-period simpliﬁcation is made without loss
of generality, since the formula for the optimal UI beneﬁt level derived below applies to
inﬁnite-horizon or OLG models where agents face repeated unemployment shocks. Also,
while the shock analyzed here is unemployment, the methods below can be easily adapted
to analyze other programs that insure income shocks such as workers compensation and
disability insurance.
The basic structure of the model is as follows. Individuals make consumption and sav-
ings decisions in the ﬁrst period, recognizing that they may be laid oﬀ with some exogenous
probability at the end of the ﬁrst period. Agents always supply one unit of labor when
employed. In the second period, if they are laid oﬀ, individuals choose their unemploy-
ment duration deterministically, subject to the level of UI beneﬁts being provided and other
resources such as income from spousal labor supply or borrowing.9
This model is identical to that of Baily (1978), except that agents choose labor supply
directly here instead of choosing it stochastically by picking a level of search intensity and a
reservation wage. This simpliﬁcation of the search problem facilitates the exposition without
any loss of generality.
The following notation is used: s denotes saving in period 1, δ is the agent’s discount
factor, p is the probability of becoming unemployed in period 2, l ∈ [0,1] is labor supply
8Browning and Crossley (2001) observe that there is substantial heterogeneity among unemployed agents
in responses to UI beneﬁts, and argue that conclusions based on the representative-agent Baily model could
be misleading. I discuss consequences of relaxing the representative-agent assumption at the end of section
4.
9Note that even though this model has two periods, it remains a static model of unemployment since
agents do not make dynamic search decisions. The purpose of the ﬁrst period is only to allow for distortions
in saving as a result of changes in UI beneﬁts.
5within the unemployed state in period 2, w is the wage, and y other non-UI income in the
unemployed state. In practice, y can include severance payments, spousal earnings, ﬁnancial
assistance from relatives, and borrowing against future income. There is a convex cost of
obtaining other income while unemployed, η(y), which is intended to ﬂexibly capture the
disutility of a spouse working, the cost of taking ﬁnancial assistance from others, or the cost
of borrowing.
Following the existing literature on optimal UI, I assume that utility is additive over
consumption and leisure, i.e. there is no complementarity between consumption and leisure
(unemployment).10 Utility over consumption is given by a concave smooth function u(c).
The single consumption good c, which is equivalent to total expenditure here, is a composite
of all the consumption goods in the economy. The disutility of supplying l units of labor
in the unemployed state is given by a convex smooth function ψ(l). In the context of job
search, ψ(l) captures both the costs of ﬁnding employment for a fraction l of the period and
the direct disutility of supplying l units of labor in period 2.
Unemployment insurance is modeled as a pay-as-you-go system where taxes collected in
a given period are used to ﬁnance beneﬁts in that period. UI is ﬁnanced by a tax τ on the
wages of employed agents in period 2.11 To distinguish income and price eﬀects, consider
a two-part UI system that pays a lump-sum of b0 upon unemployment and a proportional
beneﬁt b that is a linear function of the unemployment duration. Hence, total UI beneﬁts
for an unemployment duration (1−l) are b0+b(1−l). With this notation, if the individual
10While this assumption is made primarily to facilitate comparisons with previous studies, it is worth
noting that there is some evidence for it. Gruber (1997) ﬁnds that agents who anticipate temporary layoﬀs
do not reduce consumption at all while unemployed, suggesting that complementarities between consumption
and unemployment are small.
11The assumption that the UI tax is collected only in period 2 is made only for modeling convenience.
I nam o r er e a l i s t i cm o d e lw h e r et h es e to fw o r k e r sw h o are at risk of unemployment is constant over time,
imposing the UI tax in all periods would generate identical results to those derived below. If the tax were
collected in both periods in the current model, the optimal level of UI would depend on the value of r − δ
because the system would eﬀectively be partially funded.
6is unemployed in the second period, he chooses labor supply and unearned income by solving
max
l∈[0,1],y
u(s + y + b0 +( 1− l)b + lw(1 − τ)) − ψ(l) − η(y) (1)




The model is closed by a balanced-budget constraint for the provider of UI beneﬁts:
τw(1 − p + pl)=p(b0 + b(1 − l))
In the empirical implementation below, I use diﬀerences in UI laws across states that create
variation in b0 to estimate income eﬀects. However, to simplify the comparison of my results
on optimal UI to the benchmark case analyzed by Baily and Gruber, I compute the optimal
UI beneﬁt rate in a system that pays only a proportional beneﬁt b. In other words, I derive
a formula below that identiﬁes the optimal b when the initial lump-sum payment is restricted
to b0 =0 .12 In this case, the optimal beneﬁtr a t eb∗ is given by the value of b that maximizes
expected utility given behavioral responses:
b
∗ =a r g m a x
b
V1(s(b),y(b),l(b))
s.t. τw(1 − p + pl)=pb(1 − l)
The solution to this optimization problem is simpliﬁed by making use of the Envelope con-
ditions ∂V
∂s =0 , ∂V
∂y =0 , ∂V
∂l =0 . Letting uc denote the marginal utility of consumption, c1
12I abstract from the optimal lump-sum grant since the goal of this paper is to analyze the optimal level
of UI beneﬁts. A recent strand of the literature has focused on richer dynamic search models to analyze the
optimal path of UI beneﬁts (Hopenhayn and Niccolini (1997), Werning (2002)). However, the optimal level
of beneﬁts continues to depend on essentially the same basic parameters in these models.
7c o n s u m p t i o ni np e r i o d1 ,ce
2 consumption when employed in period 2, and cu
2 consumption








= p(1 − l)uc(c
u
2) (2)
The intuition for this condition is that the social planner equates the marginal utility of
providing another dollar of UI beneﬁts to the agent — the right hand side of the equation
— with the cost of raising the UI tax to ﬁnance that dollar of beneﬁts — the left hand side.
This optimality condition applies to a wide class of dynamic models beyond the simple
static framework analyzed here. To see this, note that in any optimization model, envelope
conditions will continue to apply, allowing us to focus only on the direct eﬀects of the UI tax
and beneﬁts. If the government is required to balance the budget of the UI program within
every period, it cannot shift resources intertemporally, and the marginal cost and marginal
beneﬁto fc h a n g i n gb coincide exactly with those in the preceding equation.
After some algebraic rearrangement, the optimality condition in (2) can be written as




To obtain the formula that Gruber uses in his calibration, I follow Baily’s method of
deriving an approximation to this equation. In my formulation of the model, Baily’s sim-
pliﬁcations are equivalent to assuming that (1) the probability of unemployment (p)i ss m a l l
and (2) ﬁrst-order Taylor expansions of uc(c) approximate marginal utility well. Under
these assumptions, letting γ = −ucc











∗)γ = ε1−l,b (4)
This formula shows that the optimal rate of beneﬁts is chosen by trading oﬀ the beneﬁts of
smoothing consumption across states with the distortionary costs of UI. The distortionary
cost is captured on the right hand side of (4) in the elasticity of unemployment durations
with respect to the level of beneﬁts. The welfare gain from UI is reﬂe c t e do nt h el e f th a n d
side of (4) in the product of ∆c
c (b),w h i c hq u a n t i ﬁes the consumption-smoothing beneﬁts of
UI, and γ,w h i c hr e ﬂects the value of having a smoother consumption path.
A note on methodology: The formula for the optimal UI beneﬁt rate could be written in
terms of the primitives of the model by choosing a parametric speciﬁcation for u, η, ψ,e t c .
The advantage of using (4) instead is that the optimal beneﬁt rate can be computed from
empirical estimates of behavioral responses such as ε1−l,b without knowledge of the structure
of other insurance mechanisms that the agent can use. In particular, there is no need to
explicitly specify the agent’s discount factor, the cost of spousal labor supply, or the agent’s
ability to borrow, each of which may be diﬃcult to estimate.
2.2 Existing Calibrations
Several studies have estimated ∆c
c (b) using data on the behavior of the unemployed. I
use Gruber’s (1997) estimates of the drop in food consumption during unemployment as a
function of the replacement rate b
w. M o r er e c e n tw o r kﬁnds fairly similar estimates for the
UI system in the US using broader measures of expenditure beyond food consumption and
diﬀerent methods of identiﬁcation.14 In addition, since c is total expenditure in the model,
13To check the quality of the approximation, I computed the exact solution with CRRA utility (u(c)=
c1−γ
1−γ ), l =0 ,a n dp = .05. Results diﬀered by at most 3% for the optimal replacement rate.
14Gruber (1998) uses data from the CEX to conﬁrm that similar results are obtained for other expenditures
besides food. Browning and Crossley (2001) ﬁnd more limited consumption-smoothing beneﬁts for UI in
9c is likely to be more sensitive to changes in UI than food, insofar as food is a necessity.
Hence, Gruber’s food estimates should place a lower bound on the consumption-smoothing










This equation shows that consumption would drop by 24% in the absence of UI, and reﬂects
t h ef a c tt h a tc o n s u m p t i o nd r o p sb ya p p r o x i m a t e l y1 0 %a tt h em e a nU Ir e p l a c e m e n tr a t e
of 50%. These estimates reveal that individuals have substantial resources to mitigate
the impact of unemployment on consumption besides government-provided unemployment
insurance. This is the reason that b∗ is much lower using the Baily-Gruber method than in
models where UI is assumed to be the only source of income while unemployed, which ﬁnd
optimal replacement rates from 70-100% (e.g. Flemming (1978), Davidson and Woodbury
(1997), Hopenhayn and Niccolini (1998)).15






















This formula shows that the optimal replacement rate is highly sensitive to the value of γ,
Canada. Stephens (2001) and Aguiar and Hurst (2004) ﬁnd results similar to those of Gruber for the food
consumption drop during unemployment using diﬀerent methods and datasets.
15In view of the importance of other sources of income in practice, these papers can be interpreted as
giving optimal replacement rates for consumption while unemployed, rather than optimal replacement rates
for UI beneﬁts.
16Gruber’s consumption-smoothing estimates are for the entire population, not just those who take up
UI. Meyer’s original elasticity estimate of 0.8 is only for UI recipients. Given that non-UI recipients do not
respond to the level of UI beneﬁts, Gruber multiplies Meyer’s elasticity by the takeup rate of UI to arrive
at the 0.432 elasticity for his calculations.
10especially at the lower end of the range:
γ 1 2 3 4 5 10
b
w
∗ 0 0.06 0.33 0.46 0.54 0.7
Gruber concludes that unless risk aversion is very high (γ > 2), “the distortions of UI
to search behavior are so large that the optimal beneﬁt level is fairly low.” Unfortunately,
estimates of γ are limited and are usually drawn from introspection about choices between
gambles or experiments with small stakes that may not be informative about the risk pref-
erences of unemployed agents.17 The danger of using estimates based on introspection is
underscored by the recent experimental work of Holt and Laury (2002), who show that sub-
jects exhibit much higher degrees of risk aversion when playing with large real stakes than
when introspecting about hypothetical gambles. Moreover, recent work on consumption of
durables and liquidity constraints suggests that change in marginal utility induced by a tem-
porary income shock may be very diﬀerent from the eﬀect of permanent shocks. Browning
and Crossley (2003) show that the consumption of small durables such as clothes can reduce
risk aversion with respect to temporary income shocks, because agents can reduce expen-
ditures by postponing purchase of these durables without much of a welfare cost. On the
other hand, Chetty (2004) and Chetty and Szeidl (2004) show that the consumption of large
durables that involve transaction costs such as housing and vehicles amplify risk aversion
with respect to temporary or moderate shocks, because they force agents to concentrate all
their changes on a small share of their budget. These results point to the advantages of
estimating γ directly from data on the behavior of unemployed agents.
17One exception is Hausman (1985), who estimates risk aversion for disability insurance applicants directly
from data on application and award rates. Estimates from his method are somewhat sensitive to functional
form assumptions, ranging from γ =1to γ =4depending on the discount rate.
112.3 Estimating γ from Income and Price Elasticities
To derive an estimator for γ, let us begin from the ﬁrst order condition that determines the
agent’s choice of l when unemployed:
(e w − b)uc(cunemp)=ψl (8)
where cunemp = s + y + b0 +( 1− l)b + le w is consumption in the unemployed state and
e w = w(1 − τ) denotes the net-of-tax wage that the individual earns by working. I begin
under the assumption that exogenous increases in UI beneﬁts and unearned income do not







∂b0 =0 . Taking account of these crowdout eﬀects only raises the estimates
of γ and the optimal beneﬁt level further, as discussed below.18




(e w − b)ucc





uc − (1 − l)(e w − b)ucc
(e w − b)2ucc − ψll
Using a Slutsky decomposition, the pure price (substitution) eﬀect ∂lc











18The expression for γ derived below also ignores changes in the UI tax rate t associated with changes
in b,b ya s s u m i n g∂ e w
∂b =0 . This simpliﬁcation is unlikely to aﬀect the empirical estimates of γ for two
reasons: (1) The change in the UI tax needed to ﬁnance an increase in UI beneﬁts is small if p, the fraction
of unemployed agents, is small; in the limit, as p → 0, ∂t
∂b → 0. In practice, the wage base is very large
relative to total UI beneﬁts, so p is indeed quite small. (2) In practice, UI is ﬁnanced by a payroll tax on the
ﬁrst $10,000 of each worker’s salary. For the majority of workers, the UI tax therefore has only an income
eﬀect. Changes in total income due to changes in the UI tax are small based on the ﬁrst reason. Hence,
the direct eﬀects of changes in b are likely to dwarf the eﬀects of changes in t.
12This implies
∂l/∂b0




= −(e w − b)
ucc
uc







e w − b
(11)
This expression for γ c a nb ew r i t t e ni nt e r m so fm o r ef a m i l i a ri n c o m ea n dc o m p e n s a t e d














The beneﬁt elasticity can be interpreted as the percentage change in unemployment durations
resulting from a 1% increase in the proportional beneﬁt rate. Similarly, the income elasticity
is the percentage change in durations resulting from a 1% increase in unearned income from










Equation (12) gives an intuitive estimator for risk aversion (γ) in terms of observable price
and income eﬀects on unemployment durations when utility is additive over c and l.T h e
key concept is that γ is directly related to the ratio of the income and price eﬀects. That
is, large income eﬀects are evidence of a highly curved underlying utility. The intuition is
as follows. The income elasticity is large if a small reduction in income leads to a large
increase in labor supply. A rational agent chooses labor supply by equating the marginal
19Note that neither of these elasticities depends on other unearned income, y, or the level of savings, s,
simplifying the empirical estimation by reducing data requirements.
13utility of a dollar of consumption with the marginal disutility of earning that dollar, as in
(8). If the marginal disutility of labor is constant, the agent increases his labor supply
sharply in response to a reduction in unearned income if the marginal utility of consumption
rises sharply when his income falls; in other words, if utility over consumption is highly
curved. Put diﬀerently, if an individual increases eﬀort signiﬁcantly to recoup lost income
w h e nu n e m p l o y e d ,t h a tl o s ti n c o m em u s th a v eg r e a tv a l u et oh i m ,i m p l y i n gt h a th ei sh i g h l y
risk averse. In the more general case where the marginal disutility of labor is not constant,
the income elasticity must be normalized by the compensated beneﬁt elasticity as in (12) to
net out this eﬀect and isolate γ.
It may be surprising that a unique value for γ can be identiﬁed in this determinis-
tic setting, because the labor supply data we observe provide only ordinal information
about utility. To see this more clearly, suppose we transform utility when unemployed
into v(c,l,y)=f(u(c)−ψ(l)−η(y)) by a non-linear function f. This transformation leaves
observed unemployment durations (l) unchanged, but changes the curvature of u(c).D o e s
this imply that risk aversion is unidentiﬁed, i.e. there are inﬁnitely many values of γ that
could be associated with an observed set of unemployment durations? To see why it does
not, recall that (12) was derived under the assumption that utility is additive over consump-
tion and leisure. Any non-linear f would destroy the identifying additivity assumption,
resulting in vcl 6=0 . This logic generalizes beyond the additive case. Once the value of vcl
has been pinned down, data on labor supply (or unemployment durations) are suﬃcient to
make inferences about risk preferences because no non-linear transformation will leave vcl
unaﬀected.
A natural concern is that the estimate of γ from this method may be highly sensitive to the
cross-partial vcl,w h i c hm a yd i ﬃcult to estimate for the composite commodity c. Estimates
of demand functions have shown that complementarity between consumption and labor is
generally non-zero but varies in sign across goods (Browning and Meghir, 1991). Fortunately,
i nt h ec a s eo fu n e m p l o y m e n t ,t h ev a l u eo fvcl can be suﬃciently bounded that inferences
14about γ under the additivity assumption prove to be quite accurate. The intuition for this
bounding argument, which is formalized in Appendix A, is that vcl c a nb ei n f e r r e df r o mt h e
consumption drop during unemployment in a world with perfect insurance markets, ∆c∗
c .
With perfect insurance, if agents choose to reduce consumption while unemployed, it must
be because consumption complements labor (vcl > 0); if they choose to raise consumption,
vcl < 0. The estimator of γ in (12) overestimates the true γ if vcl < 0 b e c a u s ep a r to ft h e
increase in marginal utility when the agent works (and earns) less is misattributed to risk
aversion instead of complementarity between consumption and leisure.
A calibration exercise shows that the estimate of γ is biased upward by 16% if ∆c∗
c =
−10%, i.e. if expenditure would ideally be increased by 10% while unemployed. The lower
bound ∆c∗
c = −10% is likely to accomodate any potential deviation from additivity for
three reasons. First, Gruber ﬁnds that the consumption of workers who anticipate a layoﬀ
does not change at all during unemployment, suggesting that deviations from additivity are
small. Second, if workers did not cut back on other sources of income while unemployed
when UI beneﬁts were raised, they could ﬁnance an expenditure increase of 24% over their
consumption while employed. The fact that they choose not to do so suggests that vcl ≮ 0
for the composite commodity c. Third, evidence on the expenditure drop during retirement
suggests that, if anything, vcl > 0 because of the opportunity for home production (Aguiar
and Hurst, 2004). Finally, even if the true ∆c∗
c = −10% despite this evidence, the resulting
16% reduction in γ from the benchmark estimate below (γ =5 )d o e sn o ta ﬀect the main
conclusions on optimal UI signiﬁcantly. I therefore focus on the additive case below.
The estimator in (12) was derived under the assumption that savings and other sources
of income while unemployed are not crowded out by UI beneﬁts. When crowdout occurs,
the expression in (12) gives a lower bound for γ. A proof of this result is given in Appendix
B . I n t u i t i v e l y ,i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fc r o w d o u t ,t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect is underestimated because a
$1 increase in b0 causes total unearned income to rise by less than a $1 while unemployed,
because the agent also comes into unemployment with lower s and y. Conversely, the pure
15price eﬀect is overestimated because a compensated increase in beneﬁts lowers labor supply
and total income while unemployed, which raises the optimal s and y, inducing a further
reduction in l. Since the estimator of risk aversion is based on the ratio of the income and
price eﬀects, the expression in (12) underestimates γ when s and y are endogenous to the
level of UI beneﬁts.
It should be noted that the estimate of γ informs us about the curvature of utility over
the composite good c, which is ultimately the risk aversion parameter relevant for evaluating
optimal UI, as shown in (4). To see this more precisely, suppose there are N consumption
goods, c1,...,cN,w i t hp r i c e sp1,...,pN. If utility over these goods is g(c1,...,cN),t h ea g e n t ’ s
decision problem while unemployed can be written as a two-stage budgeting problem:
max
l∈[0,1],y




Writing the agent’s problem in this way shows that γ is the curvature of the indirect
utility function u(c) over total expenditure (c). Estimating the curvature of u directly
is valuable insofar as this parameter can be very sensitive to the speciﬁcation of g.F o r
instance, Browning and Crossley (2003) show that unemployed agents reduce expenditures
by delaying the purchase of a new jackets, socks, and other small durables. They argue
that these postponements do not cause much of a reduction in utility. In terms of the
notation above, if c1 denotes consumption of clothes, the idea is that c can be reduced
during unemployment by reducing consumption of c1 sharply, preventing uc from rising a
lot during unemployment. By estimating the change in uc directly, the formula for optimal
UI proposed here accounts for these eﬀects without requiring knowledge of the relative costs
of reducing expenditure on clothes or food. More generally, beyond unemployment, the
estimator gives a method of computing the relevant risk aversion parameter wherever labor
supply behavior can be observed, providing a parsimonious means of evaluating the welfare
16beneﬁts of many redistributive programs.
Once γ has been identiﬁed, it is easy to compute the optimal UI beneﬁt rate. Plugging
the estimator for γ into (6) gives an expression for b
w
∗ that is a function of parameters that









where k1 and k2 are constants that can be calculated from the consumption-smoothing
estimates of Gruber (1997) and the representative agent’s wage, unearned income, and labor
supply. This formula shows that the general wisdom that large behavioral responses justify
smaller social insurance programs is incorrect. Indeed, the optimal level of insurance may
be higher when the uncompensated elasticity is larger. In analogy with results on the
deadweight cost of taxation, the optimal level of insurance depends inversely only on the
magnitude of the compensated beneﬁt elasticity (εc
1−l,b), not the uncompensated UI beneﬁt
elasticity. Only if higher social insurance beneﬁts cause distortions through a price eﬀect
can one infer that agents are “gaming” the system, generating deadweight loss. These
results indicate the importance of decomposing estimates of beneﬁt elasticities into price
and income eﬀects to calculate the optimal size of any social insurance program. The next
section describes how variation in laws across states and time in the US can be exploited to
conduct such a decomposition in the case of unemployment insurance.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy
Unemployment Insurance is a federally mandated program run by individual states. After
an involuntary job separation, workers are eligible for beneﬁts from the state government if
they have a suﬃciently high amount of earned income during the past year. The program
17is large: In 1998, approximately seven million individuals in the United States received
unemployment beneﬁts and the program’s outlays exceeded $20 billion dollars.
In all states and at all points in time, the path of beneﬁts for any claimant who is
totally unemployed can be characterized by four basic parameters. First, the weekly beneﬁt
amount is a function of the claimant’s past wage history and number of dependents. Second,
there is a maximum potential duration for beneﬁts, which also depends on the claimant’s
past wage history. Third, many states have a waiting week that must be served before
beneﬁts are received. Finally, among the states with waiting weeks, some have a “retroactive
date” within the ﬁrst month after which the beneﬁt for the waiting week is given. Figure
1 illustrates the variation in laws by graphing potential beneﬁtp a t h sf o rt h r e ec l a i m a n t s
earning $400 per week in diﬀerent states.
The rich variation in the path of beneﬁts across states and over time allows us to study
how labor supply responds to variations in unearned income and the net-of-UI wage.20 Vari-
ation in weekly beneﬁta m o u n t sp e r m i t si d e n t i ﬁcation of the uncompensated elasticity of
unemployment durations with respect to the beneﬁt level. I use two diﬀerent sources of
identiﬁcation to decompose this uncompensated elasticity into an income eﬀect and a price
eﬀect. The ﬁr s ti st h ev a r i a t i o ni nw a i t i n gw e e k sa c r o s ss t a t e sa n dt i m e . A f t e rt h eﬁrst week
of unemployment has passed, claimants in states without waiting weeks have eﬀectively re-
ceived a temporary lump-sum grant relative to claimants in states with waiting weeks. The
grant is temporary because all claimants are entitled to the same total level of beneﬁts; it is
just that the ﬁrst week of beneﬁts is instead received in the 27th week of the spell in states
with waiting weeks. Since agents with rational expectations will not anticipate reaching the
27th week with high probability at the time of unemployment, they are temporarily richer
if they do not face a waiting week. As the lump-sum grant variations induced by waiting
20Cross-state and time variation in UI laws has previously been used to estimate the eﬀects of unemploy-
ment beneﬁt generosity on unemployment exit rates (Meyer, 1990), spousal labor supply (Cullen and Gruber,
2000), precautionary saving (Engen and Gruber, 1995), and consumption smoothing (Gruber, 1997).
18weeks are small ($200 on average), checking whether they are associated with temporary
changes in search behavior provides a strong test of the hypothesis that UI beneﬁts have
l a r g ei n c o m ee ﬀects.
The logic underlying the second source of identiﬁcation is more subtle, and takes advan-
tage of the fact that UI beneﬁts have a ﬁnite duration in conjunction with the diﬀerence in
UI beneﬁts across states and time. To see how this works, compare the search behavior
at several points during the unemployment spell of two identical claimants, one in Massa-
chusetts and one in California, each earning $400/week prior to unemployment. In MA,
the claimant receives approximately $250 per week for up to 26 weeks; in CA, he receives
$150 per week. Focus ﬁrst on individuals who have already exhausted their UI beneﬁts.
Massachusetts residents who have exhausted their beneﬁts have accumulated $2600 more in
beneﬁts than their counterparts in California. Since there are no subsequent diﬀerences in
UI payments, the higher UI beneﬁts paid to those in MA can only aﬀect search behavior
after week 26 via an income eﬀect, assuming that there are no other systematic diﬀerences
between those who remain unemployed after 26 weeks in the two states.21 Now consider the
week prior to beneﬁt exhaustion. Here higher UI beneﬁts not only raise unearned income
but also decrease the net-of-UI wage by $100 in the next week. As a result, in week 25, MA
residents have less incentive to search not only because they have more unearned income,
but also because they have a lower wage. Finally, consider the ﬁrst week of an unemploy-
ment spell. At this point, MA residents have a lower eﬀective wage for the next 26 weeks
b u th a v en o ty e ta c c u m u l a t e dm o r eu n e a r n e di n c o m et h a nt h o s ei nC A . H i g h e rU Ib e n e ﬁts
aﬀect behavior primarily through the price channel at the beginning of the spell.
These examples imply that one can make inferences about income and price eﬀects by
comparing the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on unemployment exit hazards over time. If an increase
in UI beneﬁts reduces the hazard rate of unemployment exit much more early in a spell than
21The potential for selection bias from correlations between the composition of claimants who remain
unemployed for a long time and the level of UI beneﬁts is addressed below.
19later in a spell, the price eﬀect must be of greater importance than the income eﬀect. If
higher UI beneﬁts continue to reduce hazard rates late in an unemployment spell, income
eﬀe c t sm u s tb ei m p o r t a n t ,a n dp r i c ee ﬀects less so. This qualitative intuition is used to pin
down estimates of income and price elasticities formally in Section 4.
It may be surprising that the small changes in transitory income induced by the law
variations described above can have detectable income eﬀects because the resulting change
in lifetime income is trivial. The reason that temporary income ﬂuctuations have an eﬀect is
that the unemployed have very low levels of liquid assets and are highly credit constrained.
This is evident in Gruber’s (1997) ﬁnding that increases in UI beneﬁts reduce the fall in
consumption from employment to unemployment and reduce the rise in consumption from
unemployment to re-employment, implying that small changes in income during unemploy-
ment do have a non-trivial eﬀect on resources.
3.2 Data
The data used in this study are from the 1985-1987 and 1990-1996 panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP collects information from a sample
of approximately 30,000 households every four months for a period of two to three years.
T h ei n t e r v i e w sIu s es p a nt h ep e r i o df r o mt h eb e g i n n i n go f1 9 8 5t ot h em i d d l eo f2 0 0 0 . A t
each interview, households are asked questions about their activities during the past four
months, including weekly labor force status. Unemployed individuals are asked whether
they received unemployment beneﬁts in each month.22 Other data about the demographic
and economic characteristics of each household member are also collected.
Im a k eﬁve exclusions on the original sample of job leavers to arrive at my core sample.
First, following previous studies of UI, I restrict attention to prime-age males (over 18 and
22The ability to identify UI takeup is one advantage of using the SIPP rather than the Current Population
Survey. Another advantage is that the SIPP is a panel dataset, making it more suitable to measure
unemployment durations. The CPS only gives a cross-section of ongoing spells.
20under 65). Second, I include only the set of individuals who report searching for a job at
some point after losing their job, in order to eliminate from the analysis individuals who
have dropped out of the labor force. Third, I exclude individuals who report that they
were on temporary layoﬀ at any point during their spells, since they might not have been
actively searching for a job.23 Fourth, I exclude individuals who have less than three months
work history within the survey because there is insuﬃcient information to estimate pre-
unemployment wages for this group. Finally, I focus on individuals who take up UI within
one month after losing their job because the method of estimating γ developed above uses
information from the behavior of unemployed agents who receive UI beneﬁts.24 The potential
sample selection bias related to UI takeup that arises from this exclusion is addressed below.
These exclusions leave 4,457 individuals in the core sample. Table 1 gives summary
statistics for this group, which looks reasonably representative of the general population.
The median UI recipient is a high school graduate and has pre-UI gross annual earnings of
$20,726 in 1990 dollars. As noted above, most claimants have limited ﬁnancial assets before
their unemployment spells begin: median liquid wealth net of unsecured debt is only $186.
The key covariates for the analysis are the main aspects of each state’s unemployment
insurance law in each year. The raw data on UI laws were obtained from the Employment and
Training Administration (various years), and supplemented with information directly from
individual states.25 The computation of weekly beneﬁt amounts deserves special mention.
Measurement error and inadequate information about pre-unemployment wages for many
23Katz and Meyer (1990) show that whether an individual considers himself to be on temporary layoﬀ is
endogenous to the duration of the spell; recall may be expected early in a spell but not after some time has
elapsed since a layoﬀ. Excluding temporary layoﬀs can therefore potentially bias the estimates. To check
that this is not the case, I include temporary layoﬀs in some speciﬁcations of the model.
24Since I focus only on UI recipients, the estimates of risk aversion apply only to this subgroup of the
unemployed. However, given that the relevant γ for UI is the one that applies to those who are actually
aﬀected by the system, this qualiﬁcation does not aﬀect our calculation of the optimal level of UI if the
predicted optimum is close to the mean level of UI beneﬁts that we observe, which is in fact the case.
25I am grateful to Julie Cullen and Jon Gruber for sharing their simulation programs, and to Suzanne
Simonetta and Loryn Lancaster in the Department of Labor for providing detailed information about state
UI laws from 1984-2000.
21c l a i m a n t sm a k ei td i ﬃcult to simulate the potential UI beneﬁt level for each agent precisely.
I use three independent approaches to proxy for each claimant’s (unobserved) actual UI
beneﬁts, all of which yield similar results. First, I use published state average beneﬁts in
lieu of each individual’s actual UI beneﬁt amount. Second, I proxy for the actual beneﬁt
using published maximum weekly beneﬁt amounts, which are the primary source of variation
in beneﬁt levels across states.26 The third method involves simulation of each individual’s
weekly UI beneﬁt using a two-stage procedure. In the ﬁr s ts t a g e ,Ip r e d i c tt h ec l a i m a n t ’ s
pre-unemployment annual income using information on education, age, tenure, occupation,
industry, and other demographics. The prediction equation for pre-UI annual earnings is
estimated on the full sample of individuals who report a job loss at some point during the
sample period.27 In the second stage, I use the predicted wage as a proxy for the true wage,
and assign the claimant unemployment beneﬁts using the simulation program.
The mean weekly beneﬁt amount based on the simulation method is $166 and the mean
replacement rate for pre-UI earnings is approximately 50%.28 There is considerable cross-
state and time variation in unemployment beneﬁts, from an average weekly beneﬁta m o u n t
of $102 in Louisiana to $217 in Massachusetts in 1990. 15% of the UI claimants began
receiving beneﬁts immediately upon unemployment (i.e. did not have a waiting week), while
another 16% were eligible to receive a retroactive payment for the waiting week after their
spell extended past a certain length (typically 4 weeks). Thus, 31% of the individuals in
the sample receive a lump sum grant equivalent to one week of beneﬁts early in the spell
relative to claimants who face a UI system that has a waiting week and makes no retroactive
26Most states replace 50% of a claimant’s wages up to a maximum beneﬁt level.
27Since many individuals in the sample do not have a full year’s earning’s history before a job separation,
Id e ﬁne the annual income of these individuals by assuming that they earned the average wage they report
before they began participating in the SIPP. For example, individuals with one quarter of wage history are
assumed to have an annual income of four times that quarter’s income.
28UI beneﬁts are taxed; however, most individuals elect to pay taxes on UI beneﬁts at the end of the
year rather than have taxes withheld. Insofar as income during the unemployment spell is the primary
determinant of behavior for liquidity-constrained households (and not income obtained when taxes are ﬁled),
the pre-tax beneﬁt amount is relevant for the present analysis.
22payments. Finally, the maximum potential duration is either 26 or 39 weeks for many
claimants. This is because the federal government enacted an emergency program to extend
unemployment beneﬁts by thirteen weeks between November 1990 and February 1994 during
a national recession.
The computation of unemployment durations using the survey responses are described
in Appendix C. It is helpful to have a sense of the mean unemployment exit hazards in
t h es a m p l eb e f o r ea n a l y z i n gt h ee ﬀect of covariates on these hazards.29 The solid line
in Figure 2 shows the empirical hazards for the core sample. Though the hazard rate
ﬂuctuates throughout, there are sharp spikes at t =1 7and t =3 5 . These spikes reﬂect a
reporting artefact known as the “seam eﬀect,” which is common in longitudinal panels such
a st h eS I P P . T os e eh o wt h es e a me ﬀect arises, recall that the SIPP data is collected by
interviewing individuals every four months about their activities during the past four months,
which is termed the “reference period.” Individuals tend to repeat answers about weekly
job status. As a result, they under-report transitions in labor force status within reference
periods and overreport transitions on the “seam” between reference periods. Hence, many
spells of unemployment appear to last for exactly the length of one or two reference periods,
w h i c hc o r r e s p o n dt ol e n g t h so f1 7a n d3 5w e e k s . T h ed a s h e dh a z a r df u n c t i o np l o t t e di n
Figure 2 shows the empirical hazards for spells that did not begin on a seam, and as one
would expect, the two spikes no longer exist.30 The potential for bias from the seam eﬀect
is addressed below.
29The hazard rate at week t is the probability that a spell ends in week t conditional on it lasting for at
least t periods. That is, ht =P r ( dur = t|dur >= t).
30The remaining ﬂuctuations in the hazard rate are generally consistent with the ﬁndings of Meyer (1990),
who uses an administrative dataset of UI recipients. One exception is that we do not see a spike in the
hazard rate around the time of beneﬁt exhaustion (26 weeks), as documented e.g. in Katz and Meyer (1990).
T h em a i nr e a s o nf o rt h i sd i ﬀerence is the exclusion of temporary layoﬀs, which drive most of the spike in
the data used by Katz and Meyer.
233.3 Hazard Model Estimates
The key empirical results of this paper can be illustrated with two sets of graphs. I ﬁrst
divide states into two categories: those that have a waiting week and no retroactive payment
and those that have either no waiting week or make a retroactive payment for the waiting
week early in the spell.31 Claimants in the latter set of states (INC =1 ) get an extra week of
beneﬁts up front relative to claimants in the former group (INC =0 ).32 Note, however, that
if two individuals have the same maximum potential duration of beneﬁts, the total weeks of
beneﬁts that both claimants can get remains the same; it is just that the individual in the
INC = 1 state has one week of beneﬁts shifted from the end to the beginning. One should
therefore expect this shift of income to have a short-lived eﬀect of the probability of survival.
Figure 3 shows that this is indeed the case by plotting Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the
groups. Individuals in the INC = 1 states have lower job-ﬁnding hazards in the ﬁrst month
after unemployment, but begin to catch up to the other states in subsequent weeks. Note
that the survival functions are plotted conditional on having a spell that lasts for more than
one week, since no one with a one week unemployment spell can receive UI in states with
waiting weeks.
I then divide states into two diﬀerent categories: those that have average weekly beneﬁt
amounts above the mean and those below the mean. Figure 4 plots Kaplan-Meier survival
curves for these two groups. Individuals who receive more beneﬁts have a lower job-ﬁnding
hazard rate throughout the spell, since the two survival curves continue to diverge even after
week 20. Figure 5 makes this point clearer by plotting empirical hazards for the same two
groups. Higher UI beneﬁts are clearly associated with lower unemployment exit hazards
31More precisely, the two groups contain unique state/year pairs (e.g. Michigan/1990 or Alabama/1995),
since laws within a state can change over time. I simplify terminology by referring to comparisons across
“states” in the text, but the actual comparison is always across state/year pairs.
32The states that make a retroactive payment for the waiting week are initially placed in the INC =1
category because claimants in these states usually get an extra week of beneﬁts if they remain unemployed
for more than a month, which most do. Speciﬁcations 6 and 7 below consider the retroactive date and
waiting week variation separately.
24late in an unemployment spell, well past the typical beneﬁt exhaustion point of 26 weeks.
These ﬁgures suggest that UI has a large income eﬀect on search behavior based on the
identiﬁcation strategy described above.
I formalize the results shown in these graphs by estimating Cox survival models.33 An
attractive feature of the Cox model is that it is semiparametric in that it does not impose
any functional form on the baseline unemployment exit rates in each week. Consequently,
the beneﬁta n di n c o m ee ﬀects are identiﬁed solely from the cross-state and time variation in




where Xt denotes a set of covariates that can vary over time. Table 2 presents estimates of
several speciﬁc a t i o n so ft h i sm o d e l . T h ec o e ﬃcients reported are hazard ratios (eβj
), which
can be interpreted as the ratio of the hazard when covariate j equals Xj +1to the hazard
when the covariate is Xj. All speciﬁcations only include unemployment spells that last for
more than week for the reasons described above.
I begin by discussing the results in the simplest speciﬁcation, then show the results of
a series of robustness checks, and ﬁnally address potential concerns about selection bias in
the estimates. In speciﬁcation (1), as in most others, I use the average UI beneﬁtl e v e li na
g i v e ns t a t ea n dy e a ri np l a c eo fe a c hc l a i m a n t ’ sa c t u a lU Ib e n e ﬁt for reasons discussed above.
The only controls included in this speciﬁcation are the unemployment rate and a dummy for
being on the seam between interviews; dropping these variables from the speciﬁcation has no
33Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) and Romeo (2001) show that standard hazard models could yield biased
estimates when unemployment durations are mismeasured due to the seam eﬀect. For simplicity, I follow
the standard approach because the estimates from the SIPP data appear to be consistent with those found
in other studies that did not have mismeasured durations. I also attempt to mitigate the mismeasurement
problem by including a dummy for being “on the seam” and ﬁnd that this has little eﬀect on the estimates of
the key UI beneﬁtc o e ﬃcients because the baseline hazards in the Cox model pick up the eﬀect. In addition,
in the structural estimation procedure described below, I address the mismeasurement problem explicitly
by maximizing a likelihood function for mismeasured durations subject to the recall errors. Correcting for
these reporting errors has no appreciable eﬀect on the results.
25appreciable eﬀect on the results. The estimates from this speciﬁcation, which are typical,
indicate that a 10% increase in the weekly beneﬁta m o u n tr e d u c e st h eh a z a r dr a t eb y4 . 2 %
in the ﬁrst week of an unemployment spell, matching the results of previous studies.34 This
eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient on the interaction between
weeks unemployed and the weekly beneﬁt amount is precisely estimated and close to zero.
The point estimate implies that a 10% increase in the weekly beneﬁta m o u n tw o u l dr e d u c e
the hazard rate by 3.8% twenty weeks into an unemployment spell. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction between the beneﬁt exhaustion dummy and beneﬁtr a t ei sa l s oi n s i g n i ﬁcant but
fairly precisely estimated.35 These results suggest that higher UI beneﬁts reduce search
eﬀort primarily via an income eﬀect rather than a price eﬀect. If the reduction in the
net-of-UI wage were the primary source of changes in search behavior, higher beneﬁts would
reduce search eﬀort much more at the beginning of a spell than in later weeks. Moreover,
the eﬀect of higher beneﬁts on job ﬁnding after beneﬁts were exhausted would be much lower
if price eﬀects dominated.
The next group of estimates reported in the table capture the time-varying eﬀect of the
INC variable deﬁned above. The estimates indicate that the provision of an additional week
of beneﬁts at the beginning of a spell has large eﬀects on short-run search behavior. An extra
week of unearned income through UI beneﬁts reduces the hazard rate by approximately 14%
in the ﬁrst two months after unemployment. However, as shown in Figure 3, the hazard rates
of the INC = 1 group are 20% higher than those of the INC = 0 group in the third month.
After the fourth month, there in no discernible diﬀerence in the behavior of claimants in the
INC = 0 and INC = 1 states. The diﬀerence between the INC coeﬃcients in months 1 and
3 is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The temporary nature of income eﬀect is to be
34See e.g. Krueger and Meyer (2002), who review the results of several studies on UI beneﬁts and unem-
ployment durations.
35These results are consistent with Katz and Meyer (1990b), who use administrative data on unemployment
durations. They interact the UI beneﬁt rate with a dummy for being three weeks away from exhaustion
and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects.
26expected, since both groups ultimately are entitled to the same total beneﬁts. It is just
that the INC = 1 group temporarily has more cash because they receive an extra week of
beneﬁts near the beginning of their spells.
Speciﬁcation (2) adds a full set of controls, including industry and occupation dummies,
year and month dummies, a 10 piece log-linear spline for the claimant’s pre-unemployment
wage, and other demographic variables. The addition of these controls leaves the coeﬃcients
of the key UI law variables virtually unchanged. In speciﬁcation (3), I use simulated UI
beneﬁts for each individual (using the two-stage method described above) instead of state
averages.36 The hazard ratio on UI beneﬁts rises insigniﬁcantly and other coeﬃcients re-
main unchanged. Note that in this speciﬁcation, the UI beneﬁtc o e ﬃcients continue to be
identiﬁed from variation in UI laws, and not the cross-sectional variation in beneﬁt levels
within a state that results from heterogeneity in wages. This is because pre-unemployment
wages are controlled for ﬂexibly using the spline.
In speciﬁcation (4), I include state ﬁxed eﬀects, identifying the model from changes in
state laws. The coeﬃcients on UI beneﬁt levels are essentially unchanged and remain
precisely estimated. The point estimates on the INC variables are also very similar to
those in speciﬁcation (1). However, since only three states changed their waiting periods or
retroactive provisions between 1985 and 2000, the standard errors on the INC coeﬃcients
a r eh i g h e ri nt h i ss p e c i ﬁcation.
Finally, speciﬁcation (5) conﬁrms that the income and price eﬀects do not emerge for the
“control group” of individuals who do not get UI.37 T h ep o i n te s t i m a t e sa r ec l o s et oz e r o
36When weekly beneﬁt amounts generated from actual reported wages are used, the point estimate of
the beneﬁty elasticity falls to 0.03 and the standard error rises signiﬁcantly. To test the hypothesis that
this problem arises from classical measurement error of the regressor, I restricted attention to the set of
individuals who had low variability of pre-unemployment quarterly wages (and for whom we can estimate
actual UI beneﬁts most precisely). For this subset, the estimates match those reported in speciﬁcation (3)
and are statistically signiﬁcant.
37Results are similar for the set of job losers who are ineligible for UI, who arguably are a better “control”
because takeup of UI is endogenous. However, the UI-ineligible group consists of part-time workers who
have very low levels of earned income before unemployment and may therefore not be similar to the average
27and the null hypothesis that the income and beneﬁts elasticities are the same as those for the
UI claimants can be rejected. These results support the claim that the UI laws are causal,
i.e. the results are not spuriously driven by unobservable heterogeneity in the labor market
across states or time that is correlated with both UI laws and unemployment durations.
Table 3 reports the results of additional robustness checks. In speciﬁcation (6), I omit
states that have waiting periods and later make a retroactive payment, identifying the INC
coeﬃcient exclusively from variations in whether a state has a waiting period or not. Con-
versely, in (7), I omit states that do not have a waiting period, thereby identifying the INC
coeﬃcient exclusively from variations in whether a state makes a retroactive payment or not.
The estimates of the INC coeﬃcients are very similar in both cases, supporting the claim
that it is the extra week of beneﬁts and not an omitted variable that is driving the estimates.
In speciﬁcation (8), I include temporary layoﬀs in the analysis, to check that the endo-
geneity of temporary layoﬀ status with respect to spell duration is not biasing the results.
In (9), I include the entire set of UI recipients, not just those who claimed UI in the month
they became unemployed. While the estimate of the UI beneﬁte ﬀects remain the same,
the pattern in the INC coeﬃcients is somewhat weaker. This is not surprising, since the
one week waiting period has no impact on the beneﬁt path of claimants who wait for more
than a week to claim UI beneﬁts anyway. In fact, it should be viewed as further evidence
that the earlier speciﬁcations are identifying causal eﬀects of the extra week of income on
the behavior of claimants who take up UI immediately. Finally, in speciﬁcation (10), I use
the maximum beneﬁt levels in a state/year pair to proxy for actual UI beneﬁts and focus on
individuals with weekly wages above $400, whose beneﬁt sa r em o s tl i k e l yt ob ed e t e r m i n e d
by the maximum beneﬁt. The estimates of the key coeﬃc i e n t sr e m a i nt h es a m ea si ne a r l i e r
speciﬁcations.
UI claimant. Note that the sample size for the non-UI unemployed is large because we have no means of
excluding discouraged workers (see Appendix C) and UI receipt is underreported in the SIPP (see the audit
study of Marquis and Moore, 1990).
28Additional speciﬁcation and robustness checks did not suggest any problems. Analysis of
the Schoenfeld residuals showed that the proportional hazards assumption was not violated
for any regressor except the seam dummy, which is to be expected given that the recall
problem need not be related to the unemployment exit rate. In addition, allowing for
Gamma-distributed unobserved individual heterogeneity using Meyer’s (1990) modiﬁcation
of the Prentice-Gloeckler model further strengthened the evidence in favor of large income
eﬀects.
In summary, there is robust evidence that the substitution eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on unem-
ployment durations is small, and that the income eﬀect is large. This results is consistent
with other studies that have found large labor supply responses to transitory income ﬂuc-
tuations. For example, Mincer (1962) found that married women’s labor supply responds
2-3 times as much to transitory ﬂuctuations in husbands’ incomes as it does to permanent
diﬀerences in husbands’ incomes. More recently, Cullen and Gruber (2000) exploit variation
in UI laws to estimate an income elasticity for wives labor supply between -0.49 and -1.07.
3.4 Sample Selection Concerns
Before proceeding to use these results to estimate risk aversion, I address some potential
concerns about the estimation strategy. First, one might worry that the endogeneity of
the UI takeup decision is biasing the estimates of the income eﬀect using the INC variation.
However, there is no evidence of selection based on the waiting period or retroactive payment;
regressing a dummy for UI receipt on INC shows no relationship between the two variables.
Moreover, even if there were a selection eﬀect due to variations in the waiting period, one
would expect it to bias the estimated income elasticity downward. If there is a ﬁxed cost
to UI takeup, a waiting week should deter individuals who anticipate short unemployment
spells, making the average unemployment spell longer in the INC=0 states.
A second concern is that the endogeneity of takeup with respect to the level of beneﬁts
29biases the estimate of the UI beneﬁt elasticity. In my sample, a 10% increase in the beneﬁt
rate is associated with a 1% increase in the probability of UI takeup in the ﬁrst month of
unemployment.38 If the marginal individuals who decide to take up UI when beneﬁts rise
tend to have shorter unemployment spells on average, the estimate of the uncompensated
beneﬁt elasticity will be biased toward zero. The magnitude of the bias can be gauged
by assuming that the individuals who are added to the sample through this selection eﬀect
are drawn randomly from the group who do not takeup UI. The empirical hazards for the
non-UI group are on average 1.1 times as large as those of the UI recipients. In practice,
the marginal individual who takes up UI is likely to anticipate a longer UI spell than the
average agent who does not take up UI, so the 1.1 ratio provides an upper bound for the size
of the selection bias. Starting from an initial takeup rate of 50%, a 10% increase in beneﬁts
will cause the average hazard rate to rise through this selection eﬀect by approximately
1%
50% ∗ (1.1 − 1) = 0.2%. It follows that a 10% increase in UI beneﬁts may cause at most
a 4.4% reduction in the true hazard rate, in comparison to the estimate of 4.2% that was
obtained when selection issues were ignored. Hence, this selection eﬀect is negligible.
Finally, the estimate of the income elasticity that exploits the time-varying eﬀect of UI
beneﬁts on the hazard rate could also be aﬀected by selection bias. The set of individuals
who remain unemployed for a long time and/or exhaust UI beneﬁts may be systematically
diﬀerent in high UI and low UI regimes. If tastes are uncorrelated with search technology,
only those agents who have intrinsically low job-ﬁnding hazards will remain unemployed for
an extended period of time in low-beneﬁt states; more able types will exit unemployment
quickly if UI pays little. Consequently, late in an unemployment spell, the selection eﬀect
should reduce the average hazard in low UI beneﬁt states relative to high beneﬁt states,
working against ﬁnding the negative relationship between UI and the hazard rate that was
38The probability of taking up UI at any point during the spell rises by 2% for a 10% increase in UI
beneﬁts. This is exactly equal to the estimate reported by Anderson and Meyer (1997), who use a much
larger dataset on beneﬁt takeup.
30documented. Of course, preferences and search technologies could in principle be correlated
in a way such that agents with high job-ﬁnding hazards are more likely to remain unemployed
in high UI regimes. However, the data suggest that this is unlikely to be the case for two
reasons. First, the fact that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using the Meyer-
Prentice-Gloeckler method strengthens the results suggests that selection is, if anything,
working against ﬁnding an association between UI beneﬁts and search behavior late in the
spell. Second, the interaction of observable measures of heterogeneity such as education
and occupation dummies with the level of UI beneﬁts does not aﬀect the estimates. Since
controlling for observed heterogeneity does not aﬀect the results, the estimates are unlikely
to be very sensitive to unobservable heterogeneity either.
4 Implications for Risk Aversion and Optimal UI
This section translates the hazard model estimates into the income and uncompensated
beneﬁt elasticities relevant for the static model of unemployment developed in section 2.
These elasticity estimates are then used to impute γ using (12).
I begin by rewriting the formula for γ in terms of the uncompensated beneﬁt elasticity
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(15)
To calibrate (15), note that the average replacement rate in the sample is approximately
50%, so b ' 1


















I calculate the income and price elasticities using the estimates of speciﬁcation (2) in
Table 2, the benchmark case with controls. The coeﬃcient on the UI beneﬁt rate implies
that a 10% (uncompensated) increase in the UI beneﬁtr a t ei sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha3 . 6 %i n c r e a s e
in unemployment durations, i.e. ε1−l,b =0 .36.39
To calculate the income elasticity, recall that ε1−l,b0 is the percent change in duration
that results from a 1% increase in UI income through a lump-sum grant. There are two
sources of identiﬁcation for this elasticity, as noted above. The ﬁr s ti st ol o o ka tt h ee ﬀect of
UI beneﬁts on search behavior after the beneﬁt exhaustion week (T),a tw h i c hp o i n tc h a n g e s
in UI beneﬁts correspond to changes in lump-sum grants that have only income eﬀects. In
other words, a 1% increase in b at t = T +1i se q u i v a l e n tt oa1 %i n c r e a s ei nb0 at this point.













Using the time-varying coeﬃcients on the beneﬁt elasticity, the hazard model estimates
imply that a 10% increase in b causes a 2.6% increase in duration based on the change in




The second method of estimating the income elasticity is to use the lump-sum grant
variation resulting from diﬀerences in waiting weeks and retroactive dates. The estimates of
the INC coeﬃcients from speciﬁcation (2) imply that a 1 week grant of beneﬁts reduces the
hazard rate in the ﬁrst month by 12%. Translating this estimate into an income elasticity
requires speciﬁcation of b
b0, the ratio of total income the agent receives from the proportional
UI beneﬁt in the second period to the income he gets from the one-week lump sum grant. In
39All duration elasticities are calculated using the hazard ratios and the baseline hazards recovered from
the estimation of speciﬁcation (2).
32the deterministic two-period model of unemployment, the length of the second period should
be interpreted as the agent’s “smoothing horizon,” over which he is credit constrained and
must balance his budget.40 A longer smoothing horizon will result in a larger income
elasticity, since the 1 week grant corresponds a smaller percentage increase in unearned
income. A reasonable lower bound for this horizon is one month, insofar as agents who are
paid on a monthly basis must ﬁnd ways to smooth over this period. Denoting the total
beneﬁts earned from the proportional UI beneﬁto v e rt h eﬁrst one month (four week) horizon
















The hazard model estimates imply
∆(1−l)
1−l =0 .12. Using the estimates of the mean empirical
hazards, the average agent expects to receive about 2.8 weeks of UI beneﬁts within the ﬁrst
month (given that most states have a waiting week). Hence, the 1 week income grant is
equivalent to a 36% increase UI income over the month, i.e.
∆b0
b1−4 = .36. It follows that
b
b0ε1−l,b0 =0 .27.
Reassuringly, the two estimates of the income elasticity are similar despite being com-
puted from independent sources of variation. Approximately 70% (.26/.36)o ft h ee ﬀect of
UI beneﬁts on unemployment durations comes through an income eﬀect, leaving only 30%
for the pure price eﬀect. Plugging the estimates into (16) implies γ ≈ 4.75.U n e m p l o y e d
agents appear to be highly risk averse: Reductions in income caused by unemployment raise
the marginal utility of income sharply.
40The ﬁrst method of estimating the income elasticity is consistent with any smoothing horizon, since
b0 = b there. Put diﬀerently, the percentage change in the beneﬁtl e v e li su n a ﬀected by the period over
which those beneﬁts are accrued.
334.1 Summary of Structural Estimation
The advantage of the simple calculations of risk aversion above is transparency: it is clear how
the income and price elasticities are identiﬁed from variation in the UI laws. However, while I
have tried to err on the side of underestimating γ, the preceding calculations require a number
of approximations. Most importantly, the static formulation of unemployment ignores the
uncertainty and dynamics inherent in the job search process, assuming instead that agents
are able to choose their durations deterministically. The static model also abstracts from
other dynamics, such as the potential change in consumption and asset holdings over the
unemployment spell. A natural concern is whether the estimates of risk aversion from the
static analysis are robust to the incorporation of dynamics and uncertainty.
To address this concern, I also estimated γ using numerical maximum-likelihood methods
i nas t a n d a r dd y n a m i cj o bs e a r c hm o d e l ,a si nW o l p i n( 1 9 8 7 ) . 41 In the interest of space, the
basic setup and results of this model are summarized here, and details are given in Chetty
(2004). I consider a discrete-time setting in which each period corresponds to one week.
Agents become unemployed exogenously with some level of assets. Once unemployed, agents
have an inﬁnite horizon, but anyone who remains after unemployed after one year goes on
welfare permanently after that point. Re-employment is an absorbing state. Agents choose
a level of consumption and search eﬀort in every period. The baseline probability of ﬁnding
a job is speciﬁed ﬂexibly as in the Cox model, and higher search eﬀort in a given week raises
the probability of ﬁnding a job in that week linearly. I use a CRRA speciﬁcation for utility
over consumption, and a power speciﬁcation for the disutility of search eﬀort. Each agent
solves a dynamic programming problem to choose a consumption and search eﬀort path that
maximizes expected utility in each period, subject to the UI law he faces and the parameter
41T h em o d e lIe s t i m a t ed i ﬀers from Wolpin’s model in two ways: (1) It permits utility over consumption to
be non-linear (i.e. does not assume risk neutrality); (2) Since non-linear utility makes analytic solutions in-
feasible, agents choose only search eﬀort (and not reservation wages) to make the estimation computationally
tractable.
34vector that governs preferences and search technology.
Exogenous parameters are chosen to match empirical estimates if available. In the
benchmark speciﬁcation, I set the annual discount rate at 10% per year and the welfare
payment after one year of unemployment at 25% of the agent’s wage. The agent is assumed
to become unemployed with $500 of savings and faces a borrowing constraint of $5000. These
parameters are chosen to generate a consumption drop that matches or overstates Gruber’s
estimate of a 10% consumption drop during unemployment at the mean UI beneﬁt level. It
is shown that overstating the consumption drop leads to underestimating the key parameter
of interest, γ. Sensitivity checks reveal that the estimates are fairly robust to perturbations
in these exogenous parameters.
The model is estimated in three steps: (1) Dynamic programming problems are solved
numerically given a parameter vector and UI law to obtain unemployment exit probabilities
for a representative agent in each state/year pair; (2) A likelihood function is generated
using these probabilities by pooling the data from all the states; and (3) Iterating over the
ﬁrst two steps, the likelihood is maximized to estimate the cost of search eﬀort, baseline job
ﬁnding probabilities, disutility of labor, and γ.
The maximum likelihood estimates for all the parameters are reasonable. The estimate
of γ concurs with the reduced-form results: in the benchmark case, γ =6 .2 with a standard
error of 1.5. In addition, the structural estimate of γ appears to be identiﬁed from precisely
the variation in UI laws that one would expect based on the reduced-form results. To
evaluate the source of identiﬁcation for γ, I maximized a partial likelihood function where γ
was held ﬁxed at 2.5 and all other parameters were chosen by maximizing likelihood. The
predicted hazards from this “constrained ML” procedure match the levels and path of the
mean empirical hazards in the sample as do the estimates from the original unconstrained
maximization. However, when γ is constrained to be low, the model fails to explain the
persistent divergence in hazard rates between high-UI and low-UI regimes late in the unem-
ployment spell shown in Figure 4. In other words, a high level of risk aversion is required to
35explain the fact that UI beneﬁts continue to reduce search eﬀort late in an unemployment
spell. As I have stressed in describing the identiﬁcation strategy, the fact that UI beneﬁts
continue to aﬀect unemployment exit hazard rates late in a spell is equivalent to the state-
ment that income eﬀects are large relative to price eﬀects. Hence, both the reduced-form
and structural estimates of γ are identiﬁe db yt h es i z eo fi n c o m ee ﬀects relative to price
eﬀects from UI. These ﬁndings corroborate the claim that the approximate formula for γ
derived from the static model provides a reasonably good estimate of risk aversion.
4.2 The Costs and Beneﬁts of UI
Based on the Baily-Gruber formula for b
w
∗ given in (6), the estimate of γ =4 .75 implies an
optimal replacement rate for UI greater than 50%. This calculation takes into account the
existence of private market and informal insurance mechanisms that could be crowded out
by the provision of UI, suggesting that there is a role for social insurance to improve welfare
in this case.42
It is helpful to estimate the magnitude of the welfare gain that can be obtained from
the provision of UI. Using an approach similar to that in Lucas (1987), the beneﬁts of UI
can be quantiﬁed by computing the certainty equivalent for the policy change — how much
would consumption have to be increased in order to give an agent the same welfare gain
as the provision of UI? An exact answer to this question requires knowledge of the agent’s
objective function and constraints while unemployed, such as the disutility of search eﬀort,
the costs of spousal labor supply, etc. A much less ambitious goal is quantifying the pure
consumption-smoothing beneﬁts of UI, ignoring the behavioral responses it induces. To
do this, suppose agents have CRRA utility (u(c)=c1−γ
1−γ ). Returning to our two-period
unemployment model, based on Gruber’s estimate that consumption would fall by 24% in
42T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft a k i n gt h e s ee ﬀects into account has been emphasized in recent work by Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2003), whose simulations show that the beneﬁts of social insurance can in principle be almost
entirely eliminated by the crowdout of privately-provided insurance mechanisms.
36the absence of UI, the expected utility of consumption in the second period without UI is
Eu






Using Gruber’s consumption smoothing estimates, a UI replacement rate of 50% will raise
consumption while unemployed by 14 percentage points. Suppose this increase is ﬁnanced
by an equivalent reduction in consumption while employed, so that total output is unchanged
(in other words, ignore moral hazard costs). Then the expected utility of consumption with
this UI system in period 2 is
Eu








The beneﬁt of UI provision can be computed by estimating the percentage increase in the
wage, α, that would raise expected utility without UI to the level of expected utility with









The following table lists the percentage wage increase that matches the welfare gain
from consumption smoothing via UI for various level of risk aversion. The probability of
unemployment is taken as p =5 % .
γ 1 2 3 4 5 10
α 0.0014 0.0031 0.0052 0.0076 0.0104 0.0306
The income and substitution eﬀects estimated in this study imply that the existing
unemployment insurance system in the US, which replaces roughly 50% of pre-unemployment
43It is suﬃcient to look only at expected utility in the second period of the model because we are ignoring
all behavioral changes, including savings. Hence, utility in the ﬁrst period is unchanged by UI.
37wages, generates consumption smoothing beneﬁts that are worth roughly 1% of labor income.
Since UI constitutes about 20% of income security payments in the US, if income and price
eﬀects are similar for other income shocks, income security programs in the US could add
approximately 5% of value to GDP via consumption-smoothing beneﬁts (ignoring moral
hazard costs). This estimate is an order of magnitude larger than that implied by studies
that use lower values of risk aversion, eﬀectively assuming that the compensated elasticity
of durations with respect to UI beneﬁts is large.
Several caveats regarding the details of the calculations of optimal UI deserve mention.
First, I have excluded temporary layoﬀs from the analysis, and am ignoring distortions
that UI may cause in the level of unemployment by assuming that the system is perfectly
experience rated for employers.44 Second, this analysis ignores general-equilibrium eﬀects
caused by higher UI beneﬁts. These eﬀects can raise the optimal beneﬁtr a t ef u r t h e r
since UI has the added beneﬁto fi m p r o v i n gt h ee ﬃciency of production in equilibrium.45
Third, I have conﬁned my analysis to a representative-agent setting with a simple UI system
that is universal and pays a constant level of beneﬁts. Browning and Crossley’s (2001)
ﬁnding that the consumption-smoothing beneﬁts of UI tend to be concentrated amongst low-
asset individuals suggests that relaxing these assumptions may yield diﬀerent conclusions on
optimal UI. In particular, the representative-agent model will understate the value of UI
relative to a model that aggregates agents’ welfare using a utilitarian criterion, because the
average diﬀerence in marginal utilities while employed and unemployed is larger when shocks
are concentrated on a subset of the population. In such a setting, an asset-tested UI system
may oﬀer opportunities for further welfare gains. Fourth, the conclusions of this study are
relevant for the US; the optimal level of UI in other economies may be diﬀerent, depending
on the structure of the informal social safety net. For example, Browning and Crossley
44Feldstein (1978) and Topel (1983) present evidence showing a strong relationship between the rate of
temporary layoﬀs, UI beneﬁts, and lack of experience rating.
45Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that UI can be eﬃciency improving in equilibrium.
38ﬁnd a smaller consumption-smoothing role for UI in Canada, and the curvature of utility
may be lower there as well. Finally, it should be emphasized that the result of this paper
is a statement about the optimal level of beneﬁts and not the optimal method of provision
of those beneﬁts. For instance, individual UI private savings accounts, as proposed by
Feldstein and Altman (1998), may be a more eﬃcient method of provision than government
transfers.
5C o n c l u s i o n
An array of empirical studies have found that social insurance programs such as unem-
ployment insurance, workers compensation, and disability insurance induce large behavioral
responses such as reduced labor force participation. Based on these results, some have
concluded that social insurance programs cause large eﬃciency losses and that the optimal
size of the safety net is small.46 The results of the present paper caution against drawing
these conclusions from estimates of large uncompensated beneﬁt elasticities. Optimal so-
cial insurance policies depend on the magnitude of income eﬀects relative to substitution
eﬀects. Hence, just as computing the deadweight loss and revenues from a tax requires that
we distinguish the compensated (Hicksian) elasticity from the uncompensated (Marshallian)
elasticity, computing the beneﬁts and eﬃciency costs of social insurance programs requires
knowledge of both elasticities as well.
The practical importance of distinguishing the uncompensated beneﬁt elasticity from
the compensated elasticity is evident in the case of unemployment insurance. Using cross-
state and time variation in unemployment insurance laws, we found that the compensated
beneﬁt elasticity is small relative to the uncompensated elasticity. The estimates imply
that unemployed agents are highly risk averse, and that the optimal wage replacement rate
is around 50% for unemployment insurance in the US.
46See Krueger and Meyer (2003) for a review of this literature.
39The large income eﬀect for unemployed agents is consistent with evidence of large “added
worker eﬀects” (Mincer, 1962) but may be surprising to those familiar with the static labor
supply literature, where most studies ﬁnd small or nonexistent income eﬀects.47 Unlike most
labor supply elasticities, the estimates in this paper are identiﬁed from transitory ﬂuctuations
in income for a set of agents who are highly credit-constrained. One reason that income
eﬀects might be especially large for transitory shocks is that a large part of household budgets
are pre-committed to items that are unadjustable in the short run. Mortgage or rental
payments, car loan payments, and expenses for some types of services are costly to adjust,
and therefore likely to be retained during short unemployment spells.48 These commitments
force individuals to bear the full impact of a shock on a small set of consumption goods such
as food and clothing. Consequently, small reductions in unearned income can quickly raise
the marginal utility of income, causing agents to increase their labor supply sharply in
response.49
Interestingly, these types of commitments seem to be the motivation for unemployment
i n s u r a n c ea tap o s i t i v el e v e l . I nt h eA r i z o n aS t a t eB e n e ﬁt Adequacy Study, Burgess et.
al. (1981) deﬁne a measure of beneﬁta d e q u a c yt h a ti s“ r e ﬂected by the total of neces-
sary/obligated expenses for the entire household.” Normatively, whether these commitments
are the reason for large income eﬀects or not, the empirical results of this paper contradict
the prevailing view that unemployment insurance provides minimal gains in welfare at a
large eﬃciency cost.
47See e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), who survey a set of recent labor supply studies.
48Gruber (1998) ﬁnds that less than 5% of the unemployed move out of their homes during a spell.
Estimates of (S,s) policiess for cars by Eberly (1995) and Attanasio (2000) also suggests that a large fraction
of the unemployed are likely to retain previously purchased vehicles during a spell.
49Chetty (2004) develops and tests a model of consumption commitments and preferences over wealth.
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43A Estimation of γ with complementarity
Suppose the agent’s utility function over consumption, labor, and other income while un-
employed is given by a function v(c,l,y) that may be non-additive. The agent’s ﬁrst order
condition for l is:
(e w − b)vc(cunemp,l,y)=−vl (17)
where cunemp = s + y + b0 +( 1− l)b + le w as before. I continue to assume that exogenous
increases in UI beneﬁts do not induce changes in the level of savings and other income, i.e.
∂s
∂b0 =0 , ∂s
∂b =0 , etc. here. This assumption is relaxed in Appendix B.
Implicit diﬀerentiation of (17) with respect to b0 and b and algebra as in the main text
yields
∂l/∂b0










(1 − l) (18)










e w − b
vcl
vc
(1 − l) (19)
Let b γ denote the estimator for risk aversion when v is additive (vcl =0 ). Then (19) can
be rewritten as
γ = b γ +
cunemp




I now relate the
vcl
vc parameter to the change in consumption when unemployed in a world
with perfect insurance and credit markets. Suppose the agent can trade consumption fairly
between the two states by purchasing state-contingent commodities prior to the start of
period 2 in the model of Section 2. Since labor supply is ﬁxed at 1 in the employed state,






s.t. (1 − p)c
e + pc
u =( 1− p)w + pwl ≡ W
The agent’s ﬁrst-order condition for consumption is obtained by equating marginal util-


























∗ denotes the “ideal” consumption drop in the world of perfect insurance markets.
Plugging this expression back into (19) yields
γ = b γ +
cunemp





⇒ γ = b γ/(1 −
cunemp





To calibrate this formula, recall that cunemp =0 .9w at the mean UI replacement rate based
on Gruber’s estimates, and b =0 .5w,s o





Using b γ ≈ 5 from the estimates of risk aversion assuming additivity, the complementarity-
corrected estimates of γ for various values of ∆c
c
∗ are given in the following table:
∆c
c
∗ −20% −1 0 %01 0 %2 0 %




ce < 0 implies that agents choose to have higher consumption while
unemployed in a world of perfect insurance.
45B Estimation of γ with crowdout of s and y
This appendix proves that the estimator for γ in (12) gives a lower bound for the true value
of γ in the more general case where savings (or other sources of income, y) are endogenously
crowded out by the variations in UI beneﬁts. I begin again from the agent’s ﬁrst order
condition for l when unemployed given in (8) but now permit ∂s
∂b0 6=0and ∂s
∂b 6=0 .T h e




∂b 6=0is analogous to that below,
with s replaced by y, exploiting the convexity of η instead of the concavity of u.
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∂b − (1 − l) ∂s






∂b − (1 − l) ∂s
∂b0)(e w − b)ucc
The remainder of the proof establishes K<1,w h i c hs u ﬃces to show that b γ is a lower
bound for γ. To sign the savings responses, I begin with the ﬁrst-order condition that
determines s:
uc(w − s)=δ[(1 − p)uc(s + e w)+puc(s + y + b0 + b(1 − l)+e wl)]



















46Plugging in the expression for ∂l
∂b0 in (20) into the equation for ∂s













(e w − b)2ucc
(e w − b)2ucc − ψll
> 0
To sign the savings derivatives in the denominator of K, observe that
∂s
∂b




















With the deﬁnitions of Q1 and Q2 as above, plugging in for ∂lc
∂b and solving gives
∂s
∂b





(e w − b)ucc(1 + Q1Q2)
> 0
because δp<1 ⇒ Q1Q2 > −1.
Putting together these results implies that the denominator of K is greater than uc and
the numerator of K is less than uc, which together imply K<1, completing the proof.
47C Measurement of unemployment durations
The measurement of unemployment durations in the SIPP diﬀers from that in the CPS
because it requires tabulation of responses to questions about employment at the weekly
level. This appendix describes the method used to compute durations, which follows Cullen
and Gruber (2000).
T h eS I P Pr e p o r t st h ee m p l o y m e n ts t a t u so fe v e r yi n d i v i d u a lo v e r1 5y e a r so l df o re v e r y
week that they are in the sample. Weekly employment status (ES) can take the following
values:
1 .With a job this week
2 .With a job, absent without pay, no time on layoﬀ this week
3 .With a job, absent without pay, spent time on layoﬀ this week
4 .Looking for a job this week
5 .Without a job, not looking for a job, not on layoﬀ
A job separation is deﬁned as a change in ES from 1 or 2 to 3, 4, or 5. The duration
of unemployment is computed by summing the number of consecutive weeks that ES >=3 ,
starting at the date of job separation and stopping when the individual ﬁnds a job that lasts
for at least one month (i.e. reports a string of four consecutive ES=1 or ES =2). Individuals
are deﬁned as being on temporary layoﬀ if they report ES = 3 at any point in the spell.
They are included as “searching” if they report ES = 4 at any point during their spell.
This method of computing durations results in a slightly diﬀerent mean duration than
that found in the CPS data. The mean spell in the SIPP lasts for 20.95 weeks before
ending or being censored, whereas the US Department of Labor reports a mean duration of
approximately 15 weeks. The oﬃcial ﬁgure is computed from the length of ongoing spells for
the cross-section of unemployed individuals who report they are looking for work in the CPS.
The oﬃcial deﬁnition therefore excludes the spells of individuals who become discouraged
and stop searching for work. Unfortunately, these individuals cannot be identiﬁed in the
SIPP because of the lack of reliable information on search behavior. At a weekly frequency,
reports of job search are frequently interspersed with reports that the individual is not
looking for a job; moreover, individuals often ﬁnd jobs after reporting that they were not
looking for one. Therefore, the only feasible measure of the length of an unemployment
spell is to count the weeks from job separation to either job ﬁnding or censoring. While this
is a valid deﬁnition of “unemployment,” it should be distinguished from the more familiar
measure, especially when the empirical results of this paper are compared to those of other
studies.
48FIGURE 1



























































Maximum Duration = 26 weeks
Pre-Unemp. Wage = $400
NOTE – Figure plots weekly unemployment insurance benefit payments in 1990
dollars for a claimant earning $400 per week over the entire year prior to
unemployment. MI has no waiting period; TX has a retroactive payment for the
waiting period after 4 weeks of unemployment; and CA has a waiting period and no
retroactive provision. Following the notation used in the paper, MI and TX are INC
 1 states and CA is an INC  0 state. For this claimant, all three states have a
maximum duration for UI benefits of 26 weeks; since CA has a one week waiting
period, benefits terminate in the 27th week after the job separation.





































Empirical Hazards for UI Claimants
NOTE – Figure plots unemployment exit hazards for core sample. Data on
unemployment durations is from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
1985-2000. The sample consists of all prime-aged males who (1) took up
unemployment insurance benefits within one month of a job separation, (2) reported
searching for a job at some point during the spell, (3) never reported that they were
on temporary layoff, and (4) were unemployed for more than one week. The hazard
rate in week t is defined as the probability that an individual who is unemployed for t
or more weeks finds a job in week t. In the full sample, the spikes at t  17 and
t  35 reflect a reporting artefact in the SIPP known as the seam effect; see text for
details.































INC = 1 
INC = 0 
FIGURE 3
Income Grants and Empirical Survival Probabilities
NOTE – Figure plots survival probabilities for two categories of unemployment
insurance claimants: those who live in states that have a one-week waiting period for
UI benefits and make no retroactive payment for this week (INC  0) and those who
live in states that either have no waiting week or make a retroactive payment (INC 
1). Claimants in the INC  1 states effectively receive an extra week of UI benefits
at the beginning of the spell relative to claimants in INC  0 states. See Figure 2 for
description of sample selection procedures.






























d WBA above mean 
WBA below mean 
FIGURE 4
UI Benefit Rates and Empirical Survival Probabilities
NOTE – Figure plots survival probabilities for two categories of unemployment
insurance claimants: those who live in states with average weekly benefit amounts
(WBA) below the sample mean and those who live in states with WBAs above the
mean. See Figure 2 for description of sample selection procedures.






















WBA below mean 
WBA above mean
NOTE – Figure plots a five-week moving average of the empirical hazards for two
categories of unemployment insurance claimants: those who live in states with
average weekly benefit amounts (WBA) below the sample mean and those who live
in states with WBAs above the mean. See Figure 2 for description of sample
selection procedures.
53TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR UI CLAIMANTS FROM THE SIPP
Standard
Variable            Mean         Median Deviation
Age 37.00 35.00 11.08
Married (yes = 1) 0.61 1.00 0.49
Education (years) 12.07 12.00 3.06
Dependents 0.52 0.00 0.96
Pre-unemployment weekly wage 413.96 355.11 272.78
Annual pre-unemp family income 42,195.51 35,344.00 35,621.44
Pre-unemp home equity 32,053.37 9,440.32 49,494.13
Pre-unemp liquid wealth 22,715.79 2,027.97 64,997.21
Liquid wealth net of unsec. debt 18,441.26 186.32 66,588.72
Weekly UI benefit amount 165.80 162.30 50.46
Waiting week (yes = 1) 0.86 1.00 0.35
Retroactive payment (yes = 1) 0.17 0.00 0.38
Maximum potential duration (weeks) 32.11 26.00 6.42
State unemployment rate 6.60 6.50 1.70
Weeks to job finding or censoring 20.89 16.00 21.03
Censored (yes = 1) 0.22 0.00 0.41
NOTE – The values are based on tabulations from SIPP panels that span 1985-2000. The
sample consists of the 4,457 prime-aged males who (1) took up unemployment insurance
benefits within one month of a job separation, (2) reported searching for a job at some point
during the spell, (3) never reported that they were on temporary layoff, and (4) were
unemployed for more than one week. Wealth data are collected only in certain topical
modules and are therefore available for only 2,530 observations. Liquid wealth is defined as
total wealth minus home equity and vehicle equity. All monetary variables are in 1990 dollars.
54          TABLE 2
                                         SEMI-PARAMETRIC HAZARD MODEL ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
With Simulated State
Variable Base Case Controls Benefits Fixed Effects Non-UI
Log State Avg. UI Weekly Benefit Amt 0.655 0.630 0.595 0.974
(0.151) (0.118) (0.178) (0.097)
Wks Unemp * Log Avg. WBA 1.006 1.004 1.002 1.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
(Wks Unemp>MaxDur) * Log Avg WBA 1.031 1.023 1.021 0.985
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.011)
Time-Varying Income Effects:
    INC 1 0.886 0.882 0.876 0.895 1.046
(0.073) (0.076) (0.081) (0.142) (0.046)
    INC 2 0.921 0.908 0.904 0.926 0.984
(0.103) (0.084) (0.085) (0.126) (0.042)
    INC 3 1.144 1.110 1.110 1.130 1.058
(0.145) (0.128) (0.124) (0.165) (0.071)
    INC 4 1.010 1.006 1.017 1.022 1.030
(0.115) (0.099) (0.100) (0.122) (0.061)
    INC 5-12 1.030 1.027 1.068 1.060 1.095
(0.065) (0.058) (0.067) (0.124) (0.045)
State unemployment rate 0.960 0.951 0.956 0.995 0.976
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008)
1 = on seam 6.747 6.256 6.236 6.248 6.422
(0.260) (0.213) (0.212) (0.214) (0.201)
Age 0.983 0.986 0.982 0.987
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
1 = married 1.185 1.205 1.195 1.317
(0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.034)
Years of schooling 1.013 1.022 1.011 1.030
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
1 = working spouse 1.063 1.060 1.057 0.930
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.028)
Log Simulated UI WBA 0.696
(0.113)
Wks Unemp * Log Sim WBA 0.988
(0.006)
(Wks Unemp>MaxDur) * Log Sim WBA 1.027
(0.020)
Sample Size 4457 4430 4430 4430 13108
NOTE – The sample for columns 1-4 consists of unemployed men from the SIPP who satisfy the restrictions
described in Table 1. The sample for column 5 consists of unemployed men who did not report receipt of UI
benefits at any point. Each column reports estimates of hazard ratios for a Cox model. Standard errors, reported
in parentheses, are clustered by state. Notation for the time-varying income effect is as follows: INC  1i ns t a t e s
where individuals receive an additional week of benefits at beginning of spell. The INC 1 variable captures the
effect of the INC dummy in month 1, INC 2 in month 2, etc. The on-seam variable indicates whether an
individual is on a seam between SIPP interviews. Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 use average weekly benefits in a (state,
year) pair in place of the individual UI benefit rate. Column 3 uses simulated individual benefits based on the
procedure described in the text. Columns 2-5 include industry, occupation, year, and month dummies, and a
10-piece log-linear wage spline. Column 4 also includes state dummies.
55TABLE 3
ADDITIONAL HAZARD MODEL ESTIMATES
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Retro Waiting Per Temp All UI Maximum
Variable Excluded Excluded Layoffs Recipients Benefits
Log UI Benefit Level 0.659 0.608 0.650 0.743
(0.131) (0.127) (0.125) (0.133)
Wks Unemp * Log UI Benefit Level 1.004 1.005 1.003 1.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
(Wks Unemp>MaxDur) * Log UI Ben 1.013 1.012 1.021 1.016
(0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.010)
Time-Varying Income Effects
    INC 1 0.893 0.862 0.877 0.902 0.700
(0.120) (0.080) (0.073) (0.075) (0.124)
    INC 2 0.941 0.875 0.898 1.008 1.134
(0.123) (0.084) (0.081) (0.072) (0.148)
    INC 3 1.168 1.057 1.123 1.128 1.387
(0.150) (0.160) (0.118) (0.103) (0.252)
    INC 4 0.930 1.056 1.040 1.091 1.066
(0.147) (0.110) (0.099) (0.097) (0.119)
    INC 5-12 0.993 1.038 1.022 1.083 1.119
(0.065) (0.062) (0.056) (0.061) (0.081)
State unemployment rate 0.952 0.948 0.956 0.961 0.956
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016)
1 = on seam 6.164 6.232 5.940 5.951 6.106
(0.234) (0.237) (0.197) (0.203) (0.286)
Age 0.982 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.981
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
1 = married 1.183 1.156 1.187 1.250 1.243
(0.054) (0.052) (0.048) (0.040) (0.077)
Years of schooling 1.011 1.009 1.013 1.015 1.004
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
1 = working spouse 1.077 1.112 1.063 1.026 1.031
(0.051) (0.053) (0.045) (0.034) (0.052)
Log State Max UI WBA 0.877
(0.171)
Wks Unemp * Log Max WBA 0.989
(0.011)
(Wks Unemp>MaxDur) * Log Max WBA 1.027
(0.035)
Sample Size 3687 3837 4682 6866 1715
NOTE – Each column reports estimates of hazard ratios for a Cox model with a different sample. Column 6
excludes states that make retroactive payments for their waiting weeks. Column 7 excludes states that do not have
a waiting week. Column 8 adds individuals on temporary layoff to the core sample described in Table 1. Column
9 adds UI recipients who did not take up UI in the first month to the core sample. Column 10 includes only those
in the core sample who report a weekly wage above $400. All columns include industry, occupation, year, and
month dummies, and a 10-piece log-linear wage spline. Columns 6-9 use average weekly benefits in a (state,
year) pair in place of the individual UI benefit rate. Column 10 uses the maximum weekly benefit amount in a
given (state, year). Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered by state. See Table 2 for descriptions of
the INC and on-seam variables.
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